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CIVIL COMMITMENT: Is THERE A CONSTITUTIONALLY BASED
RIGHT TO TREATMENT? O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).

A constitutionally based right to treatment for the civilly confined mental patient is now in its formative stage. Dr. Birnbaum in
his seminal article' was the first to suggest that the right to treatment had constitutional bases. The first member of the judiciary
to suggest that the right to treatment had roots in either the eighth
amendment,2 the equal protection clause3 or the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment 4 was Judge Bazelon' in Rouse v.
Cameron.' Bazelon's dicta touched off a wave of scholarly commentary' but received limited judicial recognition until recently. It was
the due process clause that emerged as the prime candidate for
establishing a substantive constitutional basis for this asserted
right.
Wyatt v. Stickney was the first case to hold unequivocally that
due process was violated because of the failure of the state to provide adequate treatment. Wyatt rationalized that:
To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory
that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail
to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due
process.'
Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Donaldson v.
1. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
2. See, e.g., Welsh v. Linkins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); Mantarella v. Kelley,
349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Walker, 335 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. Cal.
1971); United States v. Jackson, 306 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Note, Compulsory Commitment: The Rights of the IncarceratedMentally III, 1969 DUKE L.J. 677, 716-17; Note, The
Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134, 1144-45 (1967); Note, Developments in the
Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally 11, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1330 and n. 62 (1974).
3. 373 F.2d at 453. See, e.g., Goodman, Right to Treatment: The Responsibility of the
Courts, 57 GEO. L.J. 680, 690 (1969). Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, supra note 2,
at 1145-46; Note, Compulsory Commitment: The Rights of the Incarcerated Mentally Ill,
supra note 2, at 718-20; Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
4. 373 F.2d at 453. See, e.g., 46 Miss. L.J. 345 (1975); 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 295 (1974); 20
VIL. L. REV. 214 (1974); 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 206, 218 (1974).
5. Judge Bazelon has been the vanguard of the mentally ill in numerous cases. See, e.g.,
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Washington v. United States, 390
F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
6. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
7. 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, supra note 4; 80
HARV. L. REV. 898 (1967); Symposium-The Right to Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 673 (1969).
Symposium-The Mentally Ill and The Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742 (1969).
8. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), hearing on standardsordered, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D.
Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
9. 325 F. Supp. at 785.
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O'Connor'° thoroughly analyzed the justification for basing a substantive right to treatment in the due process clause. The Supreme
Court viewed the case somewhat differently.
I.

COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Donaldson was a non-dangerous mental patient" committed
under Florida law 2 in January, 1957. In February of 1971, Donaldson brought an action 3 under 42 U.S.C. §1983's alleging that
O'Connor, the superintendent of the hospital, and other members
of the hospital staff had intentionally and maliciously deprived him
of his constitutional right to liberty. 5 The district court judge had
charged the jury in part:
37. You are instructed that a person who is involuntarily civilly
committed to a mental hospital does have a constitutional right to
receive such individual treatment as will give him a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition.
38. The purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment and
not mere custodial care or punishment if a patient is not dangerous
10. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975). The
case was remanded so that the court of appeals could determine whether the district judge's
failure to charge the jury in light of Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (an official has
no duty to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional developments) necessitated a remand on
the issue of immunity from liability for monetary damages.
11. The basis for Donaldson's commitment is unclear. At trial, however, uncontroverted
evidence established that Donaldson was non-dangerous.
12. FLA. LAws EXTRA SEss., C. 31403, §1, 62 (1955-56). Florida law now provides a
stautory right to individual medical treatment for the civilly confined. 14A FLA. STAT. ANN.
§394.459 (1972).
13. Donaldson's original complaint was filed as a class action on behalf of himself and
all of his fellow patients in an entire department of the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee. In addition to a damage claim, Donaldson's complaint also asked for habeas corpus
relief ordering his release, as well as the release of all members of the class. Donaldson further
sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the hospital to provide adequate psychiatric
treatment.
After Donaldson's release and after the district court dismissed the action as a class suit,
Donaldson filed an amended complaint, repeating his claim for compensatory and punitive
damages. Although the amended complaint retained the prayer for declaratory and injunctive
relief, that request was eliminated from the case prior to trial. See O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, n. 1 (1975).
14. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
15. Compare the manner in which the court of appeals phrased the issue: "Donaldson
contends that he had a constitutional right to receive treatment. . . . In this action . . . he
seeks damages . . . against five hospitals and state mental health officials who allegedly
deprived him of this constitutional right." 493 F.2d at 509-10.
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to himself or others. Without such treatment there is no justification, from a constitutional standpoint, for continued confinement.
(emphasis added).
In rejecting petitioner's claim that the charge was erroneous
because it acknowledged a substantive right to treatment, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, per Judge Wisdom, advanced the following rationale: involuntary civil commitment entails a massive curtailment of liberty 7 and must, therefore, be justified by some permissible government goal. Justification to confine falls generally
into two categories: police power, 18 for patients dangerous to others,
and parens patriae, for non-dangerous patients in need of care or
treatment. Danger to self combines elements of both. Since
Donaldson was confined under the parens patriae rationale, 19 the
due process clause requires that minimally adequate treatment ir.
fact be established and enforced. The real key to this theory is the
principle enunciated in Jackson v. Indiana:0
[Alt the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purposes for which
the individual is committed.2'
The court reasoned that if treatment were the justification for Donaldson's confinement and were not in fact provided, then the nature
22
of his commitment bore no reasonable relation to its purpose.
The second theory in Donaldsonestablishing a constitutionally
based right to treatment was the quid pro quo theory. In the context
of criminal incarceration, commitment must be for a specific offense,n limited to a fixed term24 and permitted after a proceeding
16. 493 F.2d at 518. 17. Humphrey v. Cade, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972). Civil commitment may involve a more
serious curtailment of liberty than criminal incarceration because of its indefinite length and
resulting stigmatization. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
18. See Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, supra note 2, at 1138-39; Note,

Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 2, at 1344-58;
Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: PracticalGuides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107, 1119-21 (1972).
19. See note 11 supra.
20. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). Accord, McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245
(1972).
21. 406 U.S. at 738.
22. 493 F.2d 507, 518-21.
23. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
24. See Ward v. United States, 256 F.2d 179 (10th Cir. 1958); but see Chief Justice
Burger's concurring opinion: "[Tihe notion that confinement must be 'for a fixed term' is
difficult to square with the widespread practice of indeterminate sentencing, at least where
the upper limit is life." 422 U.S. 563, 586 and n. 7 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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where procedural safeguards have been observed.25 When these limitations on the government's confinement powers are absent, there
must be a quid pro quo extended, i.e., treatment. This theory is to
be distinguished from a different quid pro quo rationale rejected in
Welsh v. Linkins. 6 The Welsh theory stated that when procedural
safeguards, present in criminal confinement were absent, the constitutional justification for this absence was that the purpose was to
provide treatment.2 7 The Donaldson rationale differs since it is
based on the absence of procedural safeguards plus the absence of
a specific offense and the limitation of a fixed term. The Welsh
rationale is vulnerable since it could be argued that if procedural
safeguards commensurate with criminal confinement were established, the right to treatment could cease to exist. Since at least one
of the two limitations on criminal commitment, i.e., for a specific
offense and a definite term, will always be absent in civil commitment, the right to treatment does not dissipate when stricter procedural safeguards are established." The Donaldson quid pro quo
theory does not differentiate between those confined under the
parenspatriaeor police power rationale, thereby establishing a right
to treatment for all civilly confined persons.
The court addressed itself to the question of whether the denial
of treatment presented a reviewing court with a justiciable claim.
First, assuming arguendo that courts are incapable of formulating
standards of adequate treatment in the abstract, there will be cases
in which it is possible to determine that treatment has in fact been
lacking. Numerous cases are cited in which the determination of
whether individual patients have received treatment has been
made. 9 Secondly, Wyatt v. Stickney is cited for the proposition that
courts are capable of formulating institution-wide standards of adequacy. 0 In Wyatt there was agreement among the parties on almost
all minimum standards, which were supported and supplemented
by numerous expert witnesses with a "striking degree of consensus
'3
among the experts."
II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S MAJORITY OPINION

The Supreme Court's majority opinion is perhaps most impor25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); see 493 F.2d 503 n. 21.
373 F. Supp. at 496.
See 23 U. KAN. L. REv. 188, 197-99 (1974).
493 F.2d 503 n. 47.
Id. at 525-27.
Id. at 526.
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tant for what it does not say. Rather than face the issues presented
by the court of appeals, the Court circumvents the treatment question by analyzing the case in terms of deprivation of liberty. 2 "[A]
State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous
individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself
or with the help of willing and responsible family members or
friends. '3 Thus, a substantive right to treatment has not been established.
The Court may have skirted this important question because
of the breadth of the court of appeals' decision. If the Jackson rationale had been the only one postulated and the establishing of a
constitutional right had been limited to non-dangerous patients,
perhaps the Court would have been willing to recognize such a right.
However, this was not the case.
In addition, the Court seemed to be troubled by what they
interpreted as a possible implication of the quid pro quo theory.
They envisaged the theory as implying that a state could constitutionally confine a non-dangerous mental patient for the purpose of
treating him. 34 However, it does not- logically follow that because a
state must treat a patient as a justification for confinement, the
state may then confine and offer treatment as a justification for that
confinement. The Court itself states that "there is still no constitutional basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom."3 5 Indeed, such a
deprivation of liberty cannot be seriously countenanced. Thus,
rejection of the quid pro quo theory for this reason appears unjustified.
An optimistic note in the Court's opinion is the fact that it does
not suggest, as does Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion, that
the determination of whether treatment is in fact being provided is
a non-justiciable issue. Contrarily, it stated that:
O'Connor argues that, despite the jury's verdict, the Court must
assume that Donaldson was receiving treatment sufficient to justify
his confinement, because the adequacy of treatment is a "nonjusticiable" question that must be left to the discretion of the psychiatric
profession. That argument is unpersuasive. Where "treatment" is the
sole asserted ground for depriving a person of liberty, it is plainly
unacceptable to suggest that the courts are powerless to determine
32.
33.
34.
35.

See note 15 supra.
422 U.S. at 576.
422 U.S. at 572-73; 422 U.S. 563, 585 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 563.
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whether the asserted ground is present. See Jackson v. Indiana,
36

The justiciability issue has been considered a major stumbling block
by some commentators. 3 7 A significant inroad in establishing a substantive right to treatment, therefore, has been made if the Court
maintains its current posture.
III.

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER'S CONCURRING OPINION

Chief Justice Burger was the only member of the Court to directly confront the court of appeals' proposition that a substantive
right to treatment was grounded in the fourteenth amendment. 31
Chief Justice Burger disagreed with the fundamental premise upon
which the court of appeals' rationale was based, i.e., that with respect to non-dangerous persons a state has no power to confine
except for the sole purpose of providing treatment. He based his
opinion on the fact that the concept of treatment is of relatively
39
recent origin and without historical basis.
History is an important source for determining when a right is
implicit in our American scheme of justice.40 Nevertheless, history
is not the sole factor to be considered in determining what rights are
vested in the people through the due process clause. Justice Frankfurter's definition of due process is exemplary:
It is now the settled doctrine of this Court that the Due Process
Clause embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so
deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be
deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole
history. Due process is that which comports with the deepest notions
of what is fair and right and just. The more fundamental the beliefs
are the less likely they are to be explicitly stated. But respect for them
is of the very essence of the Due Process Clause. In enforcing them
this Court does not translate personal views into constitutional limitations. In applying such a large, untechnical concept as "due process," the Court enforces those permanent and pervasive feelings of
our society as to which there is compelling evidence of the kind relevant to judgments on social institutions."
Further evidence justifying the interpretation surfaces when one
36.
37.
38.
mentally
39.
40.
41.

422 U.S. 563 n. 10.
See Szasz, The Right to Health, 57 GEo. L.J. 734 (1969).
Chief Justice Burger has assumed a conservative posture regarding the rights of the
confined in the past. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
422 U.S. 563, 581-83.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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analyzes the transformation that the due process clause itself has
undergone. 2 It is submitted that Chief Justice Burger's reliance on
the lack of historical precedent appears unfounded.
Chief Justice Burger acknowledges that when commitment is
effected under the parenspatriae rationale, certain due process limitations exist. He asserts that it does not follow from these limitations that treatment can be the sole legitimate purpose of commitment. To justify this position, he states that many forms of illness
are not understood; that for others there is no effective therapy; and,
furthermore, that the cure rate in some areas is very low. Chief
Justice Burger also notes that basic psychiatric principles establish
that a patient must acknowledge his illness and accept treatment
43
before therapy can be effective.
This argument misses the point. No one would deny the existence of the above factors. Their presence, however, does not justify
the conclusion that minimally adequate treatment should not at
least be offered. Furthermore, the court of appeals' decision
expressly recognizes that treatment may in fact be impossible. In
such a case, the state would be required to provide "minimally
adequate habilitation and care, beyond the subsistence level custodial care that would be provided in a penitentiary."" This statement implicitly takes into account the inherent limitations of psychiatric treatment.
The most forceful attack by Chief Justice Burger's concurring
opinion was directed towards the quid pro quo theory. Chief Justice
Burger states that "the quid pro quo theory is a sharp departure
from, and cannot coexist with, due process principles."45 He interprets the theory as implying that the same interests are involved in
all state confinements.
However, the Chief Justice ignores the fact that the quid pro
quo theory acknowledges that the interests of the state may vary.
The lowest common denominator that should remain constant for
all those confined is treatment. When treatment is in fact provided,
the balancing of state interests in determining whether a patient
should be released remains unaffected. Only when there is an absence of treatment will the equilibrium between various state interests and the right to liberty be upset.
The crux of Chief Justice Burger's disdain for the quid pro quo
42.
43.
44.
45.

See
422
493
422

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) and its progeny.
U.S. 563, 584.
F.2d at 522.
U.S. 563, 586.
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theory is that it "elevates a concern for essentially procedural safeguards into a new substantive constitutional right."4 Burger implies
that proponents of the quid pro quo theory are misguided and that
they would fare better if they channelled their energies towards the
improvement of primarily procedural safeguards. He states that the
quid pro quo theory "accepts" the absence of procedural safeguards.47 However, the theory does not accept their absence. It recognizes their absence as part and parcel of our system of justice.
Because the theory concerns itself with substantive rights it does not
follow that the persons advocating it are indifferent to or accept the
absence of procedural safeguards.
Finally, Chief Justice Burger rejects the right to treatment
theories in toto because courts would then be presented with nonjusticiable claims. He bases this determination upon the fact that
medical opinion regarding diagnosis and therapy is diverse.4 8
It is submitted that what is subject to dispute is not the fact
that conflict exists but rather where the conflict is centered. The
focus of most of the controversy has been on whether a given treatment is the optimum one, not on whether minimally adequate treatment can be defined." As the court of appeals noted, it is difficult
to assert that it was beyond the ability of the court to determine that
50
Donaldson had not received treatment.
This is not a case where the court is substituting its judgment
for that Of the legislature. Legislators have either been unconcerned
with or ineffective in defending the rights of the mentally confined.
Abhorent conditions, present in many mental institutions, speak for
5
themselves. '
46. Id. at 587. The rubric of equal protection has been favored by the Court because of
the disrepute into which substantive due process has fallen. Gunther, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 41-42 (1972). But see, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 167-68 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (doctrine of substantive due process is the basis
of many constitutional rights). Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1326 and n. 40 (1974).
47. 422 U.S. 563, 587.
48. Id.at 587.
49. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Cade, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Curry, 452 F.2d 1360 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); United States v. Waters, 437 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But see Szasz, The Right
to Psychiatric Treatment: Rhetoric and Reality, 57 GEo. L.J. 740 (1969); Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
50. 493 F.2d at 526.
51. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1975 at 36, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1975 at 15,
col. 5; N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1975 at 88, col. 5.
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CONCLUSION

The right to treatment for the civilly confined has been the
subject of controversy since its conception in 1960. Case law, legislative fiat and scholarly commentary have contributed to the maturation of this right. Justice Cardozo once wrote:
The great generalities of the constitution have a content and a significance that vary from age to age. The method of free decision sees
through the transitory particulars and reaches what is permanent
behind them. Interpretation, thus enlarged, becomes more than the
ascertainment of the meaning and intent of lawmakers whose collective will has been declared. It supplements the declaration, and fills
the vacant spaces .... 12
Whether the Constitution embodies a substantive right to treatment for the civilly confined will have to await future adjudication
by the Court.
Anthony J. Sposaro
52.

B.

CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

Published by eCommons, 1976

17 (1921).
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